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Abstract: This paper measures the influence of venture capital (VC) on IPO 
valuations in China. It is found that the authentication effect is dominated by 
the grandstanding effect, suggesting that VC firms in China greatly value their 
reputations. It is also shown that the market-specific characteristics of 
non-VC-backed firms are more closely related to their initial returns, 
compared to those of VC-backed firms. In addition, corporate fundamentals 
play a more important role in the valuation for VC-backed firms than for 
non-VC-backed firms.  
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1. Introduction 
Studies on venture capital (VC) date back to the 1980s (Bygrave, 1987; 
Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). VC firms raise funds from institutional investors 
and individuals, and invest in start-ups. VC investors exit through initial public 
offerings (IPOs), mergers, management buyouts, or share buy-backs. As an 
intermediary between funds and start-ups, VC is widely believed to be a factor 
that accelerates research and development (R&D) and economic growth 
(Barry et al., 1990; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). In 
China, the government has launched policies to regulate and promote such 
activities. In particular, the Chinese government provided guidance on the VC 
industry’s development in 2000, implemented tax allowances for VC in 2007, 
and established a VC guiding fund of 40 billion RMB for emerging industries 
in 2015. 
This paper aims to measure the influence of VC firms on IPO valuation in 
China. It differs from previous studies in that it conducts a broader analysis on 
VC-backed firms, and controls for more factors. It also attempts to identify the 
interactions of the “authentication agent effect” and “grandstanding effect” on 
the IPO underpricing of VC backed firms. Our paper contributes to the 
literature in two ways. First, we attempt to measure the influence of venture 
capital (VC) on IPO valuations in China. Taking IPO initial return and 
volatility as proxies for the degree of information asymmetry, this study adopts 
the time series regression methodology (Lowry et al., 2010) to control for 
firm-specific and market-wide factors. Second, as the biggest emerging market, 
China’s capital market is worth studying and the results will have significant 
implications for other developing countries.  
We find that VC firms in China are young and they greatly value reputation. 
The authentication effect is offset by firms’ desire to build up their reputation. 
Further, our study shows that, compared to VC-backed firms, the market 
specific characteristics of non-VC-backed firms are more closely correlated 
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with their initial returns. Corporate fundamentals play a more important role in 
the valuation for VC-backed firms than for non-VC-backed firms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next subsection 
reviews the literature. Section 2 describes some stylized facts of VC industry 
and IPO market in China. Section 3 defines the variables and describes the 
data employed in this study. Section 4 examines the role of VC firms in detail. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and offers several suggestions. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. The first strand 
examines the comparative advantage of VC firms. Traditionally, financial 
intermediaries enjoy an advantage over average investors, in that they are 
more able to gather information on companies before financing them, and are 
better placed to monitor their activities after financing. VC firms have an edge 
over traditional financial intermediaries in dealing with information 
asymmetries, such as moral hazards and adverse selections  by participating 
more actively in the management of firms they invest in. VC firms focus on 
start-ups with high uncertainty, rather than mature corporations – the latter of 
which are favored clients for banks. They intervene in start-ups through 
various means, such as serving as directors and monitors, acting as consultants, 
participating in recruitment, and assisting in external relations. As Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2003) describe, VC firms conduct due diligence and market 
analysis comprehensively before stepping into start-ups. These firms also 
employ numerous methods to reduce information asymmetries. Specific 
contractual provisions limit inherent risks, including the use of convertible 
bonds in financing contracts, staged financing, distribution of voting rights, or 
direct intervention in management (Gompers and Lerner, 1996; Hellmann, 
1998). Hence, VC-backed start-ups show different characteristics compared to 
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their non-VC-backed counterparts, particularly in areas such as corporate 
governance and regulatory compliance (Chok and Sun, 2007; Krishnan et al., 
2011).  
Fried et al. (1998) show that board participation is more significant and 
extensive in VC-backed firms. Guo et al. (2004) note that VC improves the 
competitive power of biotechnology companies and lowers the cost of 
announcing information, thereby raising firm transparency through 
information disclosure.  Clarysse et al. (2007) suggest that high-technology 
firms with VC backing are more inclined to appoint people with financial 
backgrounds as external board members. Guo and Jiang (2013) show that 
VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of profitability, 
labor productivity, sales growth and R&D investment. Townsend (2015) 
investigates how venture-backed companies are affected when other firms that 
share the same investor suffer a negative shock. He finds that the end of the 
technology bubble was associated with a larger decline in the chance of raising 
continuation financing for non-IT companies, in comparison to firms in other 
sectors. 
  Our study is also related to the literature on the underpricing of VC-backed 
firms. Compared to general investors, VC firms have skills and experience in 
selecting and valuing start-ups. They support the development of start-ups by 
offering management skills, financial strategies, and business relationships. 
These may influence the values of the enterprises they finance. A reduction in 
information asymmetries may reduce the tendency for VC-backed start-ups to 
be underpriced in their IPOs. The IPO underpricing phenomenon is widely 
studied and is believed to be a response to the complexity of valuation (Rock, 
1986; Welch, 1992). Previous studies suggest that information asymmetry 
between issuers and investors makes it difficult for investors to identify the 
real value of corporations. Beattey and Ritter (1986) choose variables such as 
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issuing scale and ratio of retained earnings to represent degrees of uncertainty, 
and conclude that greater uncertainty leads to greater underpricing.  
Other studies attempt to understand the role of VC firms in reducing the 
complexity of valuation. Sahlman (1990) shows that VC firms reduce the 
information asymmetry between investors and start-ups. Brav and Gompers 
(1997) argue that firms with VC backing experience less IPO underpricing 
than those without. VC firms put in significant effort, through measures such 
as due diligence, into seeking valuable enterprises and helping enterprises to 
realize their potential. These efforts may function as signals to the market, 
reducing uncertainty in valuation. In addition, VC-backed firms can directly 
influence pricing in the primary market via underwriters and investors. 
VC-backed firms tend to employ reputable underwriters, which also reduces 
underpricing (Megginson and Weiss, 1991).  
The grandstanding effect (Gompers, 1996) suggests that VC firms tend to 
bring young firms to IPO with greater underpricing, in order to build up their 
reputations and their ability to attract additional funds in the future. 
Additionally, listed corporations can attract attention from the market by 
setting a low offering price, encouraging primary market investors to invest 
(Lee and Wahal, 2004), which also helps build the reputation of VC-backed 
firms. As a result, VC-backed firms may actually push for greater underpricing 
of IPOs. Chahine et al. (2007) found that while English VC firms act as 
effective authentication agents and reduce underpricing, the participation of 
VC firms in France led to more severe underpricing. This indicates that the 
grandstanding effect is quite large as VC firms in France are young and value 
reputation greatly.   
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2. The VC Industry and the IPO Market in China – Some Stylized 
Facts 
2.1. The VC Industry in China   
China’s VC industry emerged in the late 1980s and has grown dramatically 
since 2005. According to China Venture Capital Annual Report 2015 published 
by Zero2IPO Research Center, in 2000, only 100 active VC firms existed. Five 
years later, this number increased to 500, and by 2015 had boomed further to 
over 8,000 firms. Total funds under management exceeded 600 billion US 
dollars. The number of new investments increased by 10 times over the last 
decade, reaching 3,626 by 2014. The dramatic growth of the VC industry 
during these years was partly due to support from policy makers, through new 
initiatives that encouraged private capital involvement, supported start-ups, 
and built multi-level capital markets.  
    The number of VC exits also boomed in recent years. A total of 830 exits 
occurred in 2014, growing from 100 in 2005. The first three quarters of 2015 
alone saw 1,833 exits via IPOs, mergers, management buyouts, and buy-backs. 
IPOs are the most profitable and have been the most widely used exit strategy 
by VC firms over the last few years, followed by stock right transfers.   
  The A-share markets in China have become the central focus for Chinese 
enterprises, with 79.3% of IPOs taking place in A-share markets in 2015. 
Enterprises with VC backing tend to receive more funds from the domestic 
market over time. As such, we only focus on the firms listed on A-share 
markets in this paper.   
In addition, Zero2IPO finds that internet, IT, and telecommunication service 
industries attract the greatest amount of funds from VC firms. Investment is 
also more concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. 
 
2.2. The IPO Market in China 
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In developed capital markets, on average IPOs are underpriced by around 
15%.2 In emerging markets such as Malaysia, the ratio is over 80%, whereas 
in China, it sometimes reaches 200%, according to the China Center for 
Economic Research (CCER) database. IPOs in China are constantly sought 
after, with a high excess return. This is caused by the imbalance between the 
supply and demand for new shares, the regulated pricing mechanism, and 
government regulations.  
Before 2005, China adopted a pricing system where firms could only select 
price to earnings (P/E) ratios of 20 or 30 on issuing. With such high pricing 
levels, firms were eager to go public. The quality of listed corporations was 
difficult to evaluate because prices have lost their signaling function. New 
regulations introduced at the end of 2004 allowed prices to be set as a range 
during the initial enquiry, and to be decided only after the book-building 
mechanism.3 However, in 2012, another reform requires further information 
disclosure if the P/E ratio rose above 125% of the industry average.4 This 
resulted in a partial return to government price control, as many corporations 
avoided crossing the threshold. The regulation was abandoned one year later. 
Meanwhile, individual investors were also allowed to participate in initial 
enquiry procedures, which was previously limited to institutional investors 
only.5 Diversified regulations were introduced in 2013.6 Among the new 
regulations, several details are worth mentioning. First, underwriter autonomy 
in rationing, and the communication of information between the issuer and the 
underwriters, were reinforced. Second, pre-announcements had to be posted 
right after the declaration, and the term to validly issue an approval was 
extended from 6 to 12 months, thereby increasing documentation requirements 
                                                       
2 See China Venture Capital Annual Reports.  
3“Notices on enquiry implementation of initial public offering” launched by SEC, 2 Dec 2004. 
4 Instruction launched by SEC, 28th April 2012. 
5 <Management of securities issuance and underwriting>, 2012. “Book-building participants include 
institutional investors with high ability of valuation and long term invest tendency, individual investors 
with rich experience” 
6 <Management of securities issuance and underwriting>, 2013. 
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and the time management skills of underwriters. Finally, second offerings were 
permitted to mitigate the “super raising IPO” phenomenon.  
New regulations that were implemented in 2014 also aimed to promote 
pricing accuracy and efficiency,7 such as those requiring 90% of total shares 
to be issued online if the online subscription exceeded total shares by 150 
times.  
The current IPO pricing procedure in China consists of three steps. First, the 
issuer and the sponsor institution make an initial inquiry among selected 
book-building participants to set the price interval. Second, all book-building 
participants join an accumulated bidding inquiry. The offer price is then settled, 
and shares are offered to subscribed book-building participants. Finally, the 
remaining shares are offered online to public investors at the same price. 
 
2.3. Investor Composition in China 
As an emerging market, China’s secondary stock market is different from 
those in developed economies in many ways. One of the most visible 
differences is in investor composition. The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
classifies investors into three categories: individual investors, institutional 
investors, and general legal persons. General legal persons refer to the 
majority of shareholders who are rarely involved in secondary market 
transactions, except for strategic investment. The category accounts for more 
than 60% of total market value, but only 2% of annual transaction volume. In 
contrast, individual and institutional investors constitute about 21% and 16% 
of market value, while contributing 80% and 15% of annual transaction 
volume, respectively. These figures from the Shanghai Stock Exchange clearly 
show that individual investors are the main active participants in the Chinese 
secondary stock market. In the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, individual investors 
                                                       
7 “Amendment on < Management of securities issuance and underwriting >”, 21 March 2014. 
 9
own 43% of total market value and account for 86% of annual transaction 
volume, with 18% and 10% for institutional investors, correspondingly. In 
2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, the total stock value held by individual investors 
accounted for 73.30%, 72.98%, 77.02%, and 78.41% of the total circulation 
value respectively, reaching a high of 85.33% in the third quarter of 2015.8  
 
In contrast, institutional investors in developed markets account for nearly 
80% of the circulation value and 70% of the annual transaction volume. In 
1950, individual investors accounted for more than 90% of the circulation 
value of the American stock market. Direct individual investor participation 
decreased as the market developed. Individual American investors became 
more willing to invest their wealth in funds managed by institutional investors 
because of complicated transaction mechanisms and tax preferences, among 
other reasons. For example, most American citizens have 401(k) pension 
accounts managed by pension funds. These funds are the main source of 
capital for the American stock market. 
 
Compared with institutional investors, individual investors tend to behave 
more irrationally. A study conducted by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange shows 
that capital turnover among individual investors, measured as the transaction 
to capital ratio, was four times that of institutional investors. The average stock 
holding period of individual investors is only one-fifth of that of institutional 
investors. Individual investors are the main holders of stocks with low price, 
poor operational performance, and high PE ratios. These characteristics show 
that individual investors are prone to speculative behavior. Moreover, most of 
the participants that actively bid on the first IPO trading day are individual 
                                                       
8 The data are obtained from the annual reports published by the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
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investors. They account for nearly 90% of the total trading volume on the first 
trading day, and 60% of them face a loss subsequently.  
The regulations on IPO and individual investor participation might be the 
leading factors of the “double high” phenomenon, or the high IPO PE ratios 
and premiums of IPOs in mainland China’s stock markets. IPO PE ratios in 
mainland markets can exceed 30, while they are around 20 in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan markets. European markets have lower ratios, at around 13. Even the 
technology, media, and telecommunications industry in America only reaches 
a PE ratio of 25 during IPO.9 Similarly, China’s first day premium after IPO 
also exceeds most of the other markets stated above. 
 
 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1 Data Description 
 
The data are obtained from CV Source10 and Wind databases from January 1st, 
2005 to December 31st, 2014, covering firms listed on the A-share markets. A 
total of 1,265 samples were collected, including 636 VC-backed firms and 629 
non-VC-backed firms. Firms with missing values are disregarded. We order 
the samples by year and find that VC activity is growing in the IPO market, as 
clearly indicated by the increase in the proportion of VC-backed IPOs over 
time in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
9 Dealogic Quarterly Reviews-Third Quarter 2015. 
10  http://www.cvsource.com.cn/ 
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Table 1: The Percentage of VC-Backed IPO in Each Year 
Year  
VC-Backed 
IPOs 
% of Total 
Non-VC-Backed 
IPOs 
% of Total Total 
2005 5 0.357 9 0.643 14 
2006 15 0.231 50 0.769 65 
2007 41 0.333 82 0.667 123 
2008 27 0.355 49 0.645 76 
2009 52 0.591 36 0.409 88 
2010 169 0.491 175 0.509 344 
2011 152 0.547 126 0.453 278 
2012 94 0.618 58 0.382 152 
2013 0 NA 0 NA 0 
2014 81 0.648 44 0.352 125 
2005-2014 636 0.503 629 0.497 1265 
 
The stock market in China is subject to significant government intervention. 
Up until the end of 2014, IPO activities have been suspended eight times for 
periods ranging from 3 to 12 months. These suspensions functioned as an 
instrument of regulation and control, particularly at times when regulators 
were attempting to stabilize the market or launch market reforms (Piotroski 
and Zhang, 2014). Four suspensions occurred in our sample period: from 
August 2004 to January 2005, from May 2005 to June 2006, from December 
2008 to June 2009, and from October 2012 to January 2014. Reports published 
by Securities Times have shown that IPO suspensions do not significantly 
influence the market.11 As such, suspension periods are omitted from our 
analysis. The ratio of VC-backed IPOs by month is shown in Figure 1.  
 
                                                       
11 See http://www.stcn.com/2015/1106/12470715.shtml. 
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Figure 1: The Percentage of IPO with VC Backing 
 
In general, the monthly proportion of VC-backed IPOs has shown an upward 
trend during the last 10 years, albeit with significant fluctuations. There are 
three hypotheses explaining this phenomenon. First, VC firms have the 
professional skills to identify potential start-ups that may conduct an IPO. 
Second, VC firms can bring management and development strategies to 
start-ups, offering financial support to help them capture a greater market 
share in the product market. Lastly, VC firms have increased in number and 
professional competency over our sample period, resulting in more VC 
activity in IPOs. 
The explained variables employed in this study are the measurements for 
underpricing in IPO and its volatility. Different measures have been proposed 
in the literature for the underpricing of IPO. For example, Ruud (1993) takes 
the percentage difference between the IPO offering price and the closing price 
on the first trading day as a proxy for underpricing. Lowry et al. (2010) 
employ monthly initial return, arguing that it is a more accurate reflection of 
actual market value. Figure 2 displays initial returns over time, from the first 
day to the end of the first year. 
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Figure 2: Initial Returns 
 
The initial return curve of non-VC-backed firms lies above that of 
VC-backed firms. Both increase slightly before the 21st trading day and 
decrease thereafter. In particular, the 1-day and the 20-day returns are 51% and 
60% for VC-backed IPOs, and are 62% and 63% for non-VC-backed IPOs, 
respectively. These figures eventually drop to 32% and 40% at the end of the 
first year. This is caused by the IPO lock-up effect. Regulations state that the 
lock-up periods for pre-IPO shareholders and controlling shareholders are at 
one year and three years, respectively. Overall, we find that underpricing is 
similar across various windows. In addition, the initial return gap between 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms is relatively persistent.  
We use the initial return on the 21st trading day to measure underpricing. 
The averages of the initial returns and their standard deviations in each month 
are calculated for firms that went public in that month. Months with less than 
two firms conducting IPOs are omitted. The summary statistics in Table 2 and 
Figure 3 depict these monthly averages and cross-sectional standard deviations 
over time.  
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Figure 3: Monthly Average and Standard Deviation of Initial Returns 
 
Figure 3 shows that the initial return increases with the standard deviation, 
while the monthly number of IPOs decreases with standard deviation. 
However, the correlation between the number of IPOs and initial return is not 
obvious – this relationship is analyzed in greater detail in the following 
sections. 
 
Table 2: Autocorrelations of the Monthly Average of Initial Returns and Its 
Standard Deviation 
      Autocorrelations: Lags 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Corr. 1 2 3 4 5 
Average IPO initial returns 80 0.815 0.579 0.812 0.883 0.821 0.720 0.686 0.624 0.519 
Cross-section standard deviation of IPO IRs 80 0.488 0.374 0.361  0.652 0.433 0.467 0.367 0.280 
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The autocorrelations of the independent variables are calculated, omitting 
months with fewer than three IPOs. Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics 
for Figure 3. The average and the standard deviation of IPO initial returns are 
strongly correlated, with a value of 0.883. In addition, the initial return and the 
standard deviation are both highly autocorrelated for up to five lags, though 
this falls smoothly with increasing lags. 
 
3.2．Descriptive Evidence 
The sample includes firms listed on the A-share markets for the 10-year period 
spanning from January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2014. For each firm, we 
collect closing price, as well as the price and the number of shares offered at 
IPO. Total funds raised are calculated by multiplying the offering price by the 
number of shares offered. Four dummy variables are also used: a VC dummy, 
an underwriter rank dummy, a technology dummy, and a market dummy. 
Measures of firm- , offer- and market-specific characteristics are also included, 
such as the firm’s age, debt-to-asset ratio, percentage of tradable shares and 
ownership concentration in the year of IPO, the listed market, and the IPO 
volume in the listing month.  
Offer- and market-specific characteristics include the following variables: 
a) “Log(Fund Raised)” is the logarithm of the total funds raised through an 
IPO. More information tends to be available in large offerings, suggesting that 
these stocks are easier for underwriters to value. This reduces information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors in the primary market. 
b) “Rank” captures underwriter ability in IPO pricing. We rank underwriters 
according to their IPO business volumes in each year. The dummy variable 
equals 1 if the underwriter is among the top 10 in that year, and 0 otherwise. In 
Lowry et al. (2010), Lee et al. (2004), and Loughran and Ritter (2002), the 
underwriters are ranked from 0 to 9, with the same rankings employed for all 
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the years covered. We believe with certainty that valuation ability will change 
over time, albeit not to a large extent. As such, we update the rank list every 
year in this study. The result is relatively practical, with some securities 
companies (e.g., China International Capital Corporation and CITIC Securities) 
consistently being among the top 10, while others being included or excluded 
from the lists over the sample period. Highly ranked underwriters can estimate 
market demand and firm value accurately, suggesting a negative relationship 
between underwriter rank and underpricing. 
c) “Market” is assigned the value 1 for firms listed on the Shanghai Main 
Board, and 0 for firms listed on the Shenzhen SME and the GEM Boards. The 
market assigns high PE ratios to firms listed on the GEM Board, which opened 
in 2009. High-tech firms and young firms tend to go public on the SME and 
the GEM Boards, suggesting a greater difficulty in valuing these firms. d)
 “IPO_Market” refers to the number of firms that were listed in that month. 
 
Firm-specific characteristics include the following: 
a) “Leverage” is equal to the debt-to-assets ratio in the year of IPO. A firm 
with high leverage may appear risky to equity investors. 
b) “Log(FirmAge+1)” is calculated as the logarithm of one plus the number 
of years since the firm was founded, measured at the time of the IPO (Lowry 
et al., 2010).  
c) “Tech” takes a value of 1 for firms in the high-technology industry, and 0 
for other firms. The high-tech industry includes the following five categories, 
as defined by the China Securities Regulatory Commission: 
telecommunications, radio and television and satellite transmission services; 
radio, television, film, and film and television sound recording production 
industry; internet and related services; manufacturing of computers, 
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communications and other electronic equipment; and software and information 
technology services. Firms in the high-technology industry are harder to value. 
d) “VC” comes from the CV Source and is equal to 1 if the firm has received 
funds from VC firms prior to listing, as defined by the CV Source, or 0 
otherwise. The intervention of VC firms may function as a positive signal on 
the prospects and the value of the firm based on prior professional selection, 
support, and supervision. On the other hand, the desire to build reputation to 
attract additional funds in the future may negatively affect a VC firm’s 
function of being an authentication agent. 
A summary of variable definitions is given in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3: Definition of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
IR 
The percentage difference between the offer price and the aftermarket 
price on the 21st trading day 
Log(Fund Raised) 
The logarithm of total proceeds raised, calculated by multiplying the 
number of shares offered in the IPO by the offering price 
Leverage   The debt-to-asset ratio in the year of IPO 
Log(FirmAge+1) 
The logarithm of one plus the number of years since the firm was 
founded, measured at the time of IPO 
Percentage of Tradable Shares 
(PTS) 
Tradable shares divided by total shares in the year of IPO 
Concentration   Ownership concentration in the year of IPO 
VC   1 if the firm received financing from venture capital, and 0 otherwise 
Tech   1 for firms in the high-tech industry (such as internet, computer 
equipment, communications), and 0 otherwise. 
Rank   1 for highly ranked underwriters (underwriters among the top 10 in 
IPO business volume in that year), and 0 otherwise 
Market   1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Main Board, and 0 otherwise 
IPO_Market   The number of firms listed that month 
 
Table 4: Correlations between Variables 
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 Average IPO Initial Returns Std. Dev. of Initial Returns 
Log(Shares) 0.270 0.139 
Log(Fund Raised) -0.259 -0.312 
Log(FirmAge+1) 0.102 0.061 
Leverage 0.443 0.321 
Tech -0.079 -0.090 
VC -0.159 -0.060 
Rank -0.030 -0.105 
Market 0.527 0.469 
PTS 0.268 0.237 
Concentration -0.022 -0.019 
IPO_Market -0.328 -0.205 
 
In Table 4, we use monthly data to obtain the correlations between the 
measures and various variables to get an approximate view. As shown in Table 
4, variables such as the number of firms listed that month (IPO_Market) and 
firm debt to asset ratios in that year (Leverage) are more correlated with 
average IPO initial returns and the standard deviation of initial returns. For 
other variables, such as VC funding (VC) and firms in the technology industry 
(Tech), the relations are low. A larger amount of funds raised as well as a lower 
leverage and tradable shares ratio are associated with a lower IPO initial return 
and variation.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
The results in this section show the effects of firm- and offer-specific factors 
on monthly initial return and variance. 
 
4.1. Statistical Interpretation 
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Table 5 shows that no difference is observed between the initial returns of 
VC-backed and non-VC-backed firms. For other characteristics, our data show 
that when compared to non-VC-backed firms, VC-backed firms are younger 
and have lower debt ratios and smaller ownership concentrations at the time of 
IPO. These firms can be listed quickly (as shown by the firms’ age) and tend to 
raise large funds during IPOs.  
  Significantly and quite differently, these findings show that VC firms prefer 
to invest in the high-technology industry and employ highly ranked 
underwriters, supporting Gompers (1996)’s grandstanding effect. This 
suggests that VC firms tend to bring young firms to IPO at the cost of high 
underpricing, in order to build reputations that can attract additional funds in 
the future. 
 
Table 5: Difference Tests on VC-Backed and Non-VC-Backed Firms 
 VC Backed Non-VC Backed T-test 
(P value)  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
IR 0.645 0.998 0.660 0.861 0.742 
Log(Fund Raised) 4.760 0.383 4.696 0.391 0.002*** 
Log(FirmAge+1) 1.210 0.111 1.223 0.113 0.038** 
Tech 0.250 0.433 0.149 0.357 0.000*** 
Rank 0.508 0.500 0.404 0.491 0.000*** 
Market 0.145 0.352 0.146 0.353 0.868 
Leverage 25.472 18.921 27.655 17.902 0.014** 
PTS 20.613 5.267 20.671 5.214 0.698 
Concentration 72.438 8.446 73.808 9.435 0.007*** 
IPO_Market 22.92 9.548 20.669 9.447 0.000*** 
Observations 636 629  
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 shows that the firms listed on the Shanghai Main Board diverge from 
those on the Shenzhen Small and Medium Enterprise Board (SME) and the 
Growth Enterprise Market Board (GEM) in terms of firm- and offer-specific 
characteristics. Main board firms have higher average initial returns, raise 
more funds, and are in the charge of highly ranked underwriters. Firms on the 
SME or the GEM Boards are more likely to be backed by VC firms and to be 
associated with the high-technology industry.  
 
Table 6: Difference Tests on the SME, GEM, and Shanghai Main Boards 
 SME and GEM Shanghai Main T-test 
(P value)  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
IR 0.625 0.860 0.806 1.263 0.000*** 
Log(Fund Raised) 4.646 0.287 5.212 0.529 0.000*** 
Log(FirmAge+1) 1.221 0.106 1.185 0.140 0.000*** 
VC 0.503 0.500 0.497 0.500 0.000*** 
Tech 0.227 0.419 0.044 0.204 0.000*** 
Rank 0.422 0.494 0.661 0.473 0.000*** 
Leverage 23.705 15.956 43.089 22.842 0.010** 
PTS 20.589 3.468 21.006 10.842 0.559 
Concentration 72.556 8.407 76.356 11.196 0.000*** 
IPO_Market 22.440 9.428 18.049 9.644 0.000*** 
Observations 1080 185  
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The sample is also sorted by the underwriter’s rank. As shown in Table 7, the 
differences between initial returns are insignificant. Highly ranked 
underwriters engage in large-scale IPOs, as measured by the volume of funds 
raised. IPOs tend to take place on the Shanghai Main Board if highly ranked 
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underwriters are employed. Firm-specific characteristics are also significantly 
different. The firms with highly ranked underwriters bear high leverage and 
have high ownership concentration. 
 
Table 7: Difference Tests on Highly Ranked and Not Highly Ranked Underwriters 
 Highly Ranked Not Highly Ranked T-test 
(P value)  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
IR 0.578 0.841 0.715 0.999 0.472 
Log(Fund Raised) 4.828 0.451 4.645 0.303 0.000*** 
Log(FirmAge+1) 1.212 0.119 1.220 0.106 0.119 
VC 0.560 0.496 0.455 0.498 0.000*** 
Tech 0.203 0.402 0.198 0.398 0.886 
Market 0.210 0.406 0.092 0.288 0.000*** 
Leverage 28.326 20.599 25.075 16.265 0.000*** 
PTS 20.703 6.634 20.590 3.682 0.056* 
Concentration 73.872 9.282 72.488 8.647 0.005*** 
IPO_Market 20.780 9.664 22.622 9.437 0.000*** 
Observations 597 688  
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our sample consists of 253 high-technology firms. From Table 8, the initial 
returns of firms in the high-technology industry are significantly higher than 
those of non-high-technology firms. Compared to non-high-technology firms, 
high-technology firms are on average younger, with significantly lower 
leverage and smaller percentages of tradable shares. Most of these 
high-technology firms are listed on the SME or the GEM Boards. In contrast 
to VC-backed firms, high-technology firms do not employ highly ranked 
underwriters. 
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Table 8: Difference Tests on High Tech and Non-High Tech Firms 
 High Tech Non-High Tech T-test 
(P value)  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
IR 0.678 0.895 0.646 0.941 0.000*** 
Log(Shares) 3.292 0.228 3.525 0.454 0.000*** 
Log(Fund Raised) 4.622 0.287 4.755 0.406 0.425 
Log(FirmAge+1) 1.205 0.102 1.219 0.115 0.000*** 
VC 0.628 0.483 0.471 0.499 0.000*** 
Rank 0.462 0.499 0.455 0.498 0.663 
Market 0.032 0.175 0.174 0.379 0.000*** 
Leverage 18.278 12.275 28.628 19.146 0.000*** 
PTS 20.477 2.841 20.683 5.684 0.001*** 
Concentration 72.477 7.155 73.280 9.371 0.229 
IPO_Market 22.538 9.256 21.593 9.671 0.000*** 
Observations 253 1012  
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.2. The Model 
We estimate the following model:  
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The variance of the error term in the mean regression model is assumed to be a 
function of the same firm- and offer-specific characteristics in the initial return 
regression model. The maximum likelihood estimator is similar to the least 
squares estimator for the initial return equation, and uses the standard 
deviations as weights. The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to 
estimate the influence of each characteristic on both levels, namely initial 
returns and the uncertainty of firm-level initial returns (Lowry et al., 2010). 
 
  As shown in Section 2, notable autocorrelations between the initial return 
and its variance are found. We treat the data as time series data (Lowry et al., 
2010). Individual observations are considered a realization of a time series 
process, and we order the firms by the dates of their offers. When multiple 
IPOs are offered on a single day, we randomly order the firms in question.  
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As a benchmark, we run an OLS regression and determine that the residuals 
are highly clustered. OLS is not able to capture the characteristics of the data 
as shown in Table 9 and Figure 4. 
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Table 9: Estimation Results 
 OLS MLE ARMA(1,1) 
Intercept 5.237 2.718 0.448 
 (8.440) (6.253) (2.830) 
Leverage 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.001** 
 (5.170) (5.922) (2.230) 
Log(FirmAge +1) -0.180 -0.059 0.057 
 (-0.940) (-0.364) (0.810) 
IPO_Market -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.000 
 (-4.090) (-4.635) (0.033) 
Tech 0.063 0.096** 0.021 
 (1.030) (2.183) (1.163) 
Rank -0.079* -0.032 -0.055*** 
 (-1.720) (-0.872) (-3.465) 
VC 0.100** 0.057 0.032** 
 (2.086) (1.573) (2.382) 
Market 0.556*** 0.215*** 0.021 
 (6.638) (2.952) (0.753) 
Concentration 0.003 0.002 -0.002* 
 (0.997) (0.813) (-1.927) 
Log(Fund Raised) -1.030*** -0.517*** -0.088*** 
 (-13.625) (-7.832) (-3.829) 
PTS 0.010** 0.014*** 0.001 
 (2.291) (3.344) (0.480) 
    
AR(1)   0.959 
   (126.248) 
MA(1)   -0.826 
   (-37.056) 
Variance intercept 6.468 4.704 
  (8.122) (5.921) 
Leverage  0.016*** 0.020*** 
  (6.682) (8.589) 
Log(FirmAge +1) -1.044** -0.084 
  (-2.456) (-0.200) 
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IPO_Market  -0.040*** -0.023*** 
  (-8.334) (-5.276) 
Tech -0.082 0.097 
  (-0.771) (0.915) 
Rank -0.064 -0.130 
  (-0.693) (-1.450) 
VC 0.466*** 0.348*** 
  (5.502) (3.956) 
Market 0.513*** 0.987*** 
  (3.451) (6.401) 
Concentration  0.006 -0.006 
  (1.446) (-1.323) 
Log(Fund Raised)  -1.403*** -1.262*** 
  (-11.256) (-11.787) 
PTS 0.022*** 0.007 
  (2.771) (1.153) 
Log Likelihood -1629.109 -1362.266 -969.236 
AIC 3114.012 2768.531 1986.471 
Box-Ljung 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Sample Size 1265 1265 1265 
*Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
The fitted values and residuals of OLS and ARMA(1,1) models are compared 
in Figure 4. The ARMA(1,1) model captures the volatility of the data well, 
with the autocorrelation of the error term identified. 
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Figure 4: Comparison of OLS and ARMA(1,1) Results 
 
The magnitude of the AR and the MA terms indicates that the residual 
autocorrelations are persistent.  
For firm-specific characteristics, the age of the firm and whether the firm is 
involved in the high-technology industry do not affect IPO underpricing or the 
volatility. The estimation results above show that VC-backed firms are 
younger and more likely to be involved in the high-technology industry. While 
being “younger” or “high-tech” does not seem to cause greater uncertainty, 
this information does not seem to be valued by investors either. The reason 
may lie in the fact that the majority of investors in the Chinese stock markets 
are individual investors, particularly in the secondary market. This will 
influence the estimation of value in the primary market. 
 
VC backing positively affects underpricing and volatility. On the one hand, 
VC backing sends a positive signal on the prospects and the value of the firm, 
on the basis of professional selection, support, and supervision. This reduces 
information asymmetry, leading to lower underpricing. Additionally, VC firms 
tend to hire highly ranked IPO underwriters, which reduces the possibility of 
underpricing. On the other hand, VC firms may desire to build up their 
reputation to attract additional funds in the future, at the cost of high 
underpricing. In our sample, the rankings of underwriters for VC-backed firms 
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are higher on average than those for non-VC-backed firms. The regression 
result suggests that a highly ranked underwriter can reduce underpricing. The 
positive effect of VC may be purely an intentional phenomenon on the part of 
VC firms to build up their reputation. While the “authentication agents effect” 
seems to be overwhelmed by the reputation-building effort, the leverage and 
the total funds raised parameters coincide with initial expectations, implying 
that increased uncertainty can cause large underpricing and volatility in IPOs. 
Figure 2 shows that the initial returns of VC-backed firms at various points in 
time are all lower than those of non-VC-backed firms. The correlations 
between each set of variables are calculated in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Correlations between Variables 
 IR Leverage 
Log(Firm 
Age+1) 
IPO_ 
Market 
Tech Rank VC Market Concentration 
Log (Fund 
Raised) 
Leverage 0.193          
Log(FirmAge+1) 0.037 0.073         
IPO_Market -0.262 -0.285 -0.121        
Tech 0.014 -0.224 -0.050 0.039       
Rank -0.073 0.088 -0.035 -0.096 0.006      
VC -0.008 -0.059 -0.057 0.118 0.126 0.104     
Market 0.066 0.371 -0.110 -0.164 -0.161 0.167 -0.002    
Concentration -0.025 0.044 -0.099 -0.03 -0.036 0.077 -0.076 0.153   
Log(Fund Raised) -0.314 0.187 -0.138 0.155 -0.136 0.234 0.083 0.515 0.180  
PTS 0.120 0.071 0.017 -0.148 -0.016 0.011 -0.006 0.023 -0.154 -0.070 
 
Table 11 lists the regression results of the parameters of VC by adding extra 
variables to a basic model (Column A). The “All” column shows the outcome 
of the regression that contains all variables. The regression in Column A only 
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contains the VC dummy. Column B adds the technology dummy, and Column 
C adds the underwriter rank dummy to the regression in Column B. Additional 
variables added in Columns E and F are IPO_Market and Log (Fund Raised), 
respectively.  
With more variables (which are shown to be significantly negative in Table 
9, and the correlations shown to be significant in Table 10), the VC parameter 
becomes significantly positive. It identifies the fact that the pattern shown in 
Figure 2 is the gross influence of VC, as expressed through the relationship 
between the underwriter and the volume of funds raised. When volatility is 
used to indicate the degree of information asymmetry, an increase in influence 
and the significance level is also observed.  
 
Table 11: Coefficients of the VC Dummy in Different Regressions 
 All A B C E F 
    Mean Equation   
VC 0.032 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.025 0.033 
 (2.382) (0.801) (0.663) (0.766) (1.724) (2.299) 
Variance Equation   
VC 0.348 0.350 0.361 0.371 0.444 0.598 
 (3.956) (4.312) (4.403) (4.522) (5.410) (7.136) 
*Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
We group the sample by the VC and the market dummies, and list the results 
in Table 12. 
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Table 12: Categorical Regression Results 
 ALL Non-VC Backed VC Backed SME or GEM SH Main 
Intercept 0.448 0.931 0.466 0.358 0.572 
 (2.830) (3.575) (2.404) (2.424) (2.080) 
Leverage 0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.004*** 
 (2.230) (0.530) (1.070) (1.236) (-3.194) 
Log(FirmAge +1) 0.057 0.065 0.071 0.075 0.124 
 (0.810) (0.532) (0.719) (1.053) (0.756) 
IPO_Market 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.008*** 
 (0.033) (-0.342) (-0.549) (-0.909) (-4.890) 
Tech 0.021 -0.028 0.045* 0.014 -0.056 
 (1.163) (-0.754) (1.870) (0.737) (-0.832) 
Rank -0.055*** -0.056** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.126*** 
 (-3.465) (-2.007) (-3.311) (-3.959) (-3.871) 
VC 0.032**   0.026* 0.094** 
 (2.382)   (1.885) (2.127) 
Market 0.021 0.085 0.060   
 (0.753) (1.540) (1.374)   
Concentration -0.002* -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 0.002 
 (-1.927) (-0.566) (-2.408) (-1.585) (1.111) 
Log(Fund Raised) -0.088*** -0.199*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.128*** 
 (-3.829) (-5.012) (-2.668) (-3.580) (-2.494) 
PTS 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.480) (0.793) (-0.956) (0.676) (0.852) 
      
AR(1) 0.959 0.899 0.973 0.971 0.964 
 (126.248) (49.063) (148.824) (152.437) (54.366) 
MA(1) -0.826 -0.691 -0.841 -0.817 -0.779 
 (-37.056) (-17.598) (-41.342) (-42.007) (-17.865) 
Variance Intercept 4.704 8.028 -0.061 2.913 -0.051 
 (5.921) (6.845) (-0.073) (3.841) (-0.068) 
Leverage 0.020*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.025*** -0.001 
 (8.589) (2.041) (3.366) (10.197) (-0.464) 
Log(FirmAge +1) -0.084 -0.523 0.015 -1.325*** 0.073 
 (-0.200) (-0.853) (0.040) (-3.623) (0.211) 
IPO_Market -0.023*** -0.021*** 0.006 -0.019*** 0.003 
 (-5.276) (-3.247) (1.079) (-4.888) (0.695) 
Tech 0.097 -0.176 -0.439*** 0.150 -0.152 
 (0.915) (-0.992) (-4.246) (1.433) (-1.419) 
Rank -0.130 0.050 0.151* 0.057 -0.250*** 
 (-1.450) (0.374) (1.758) (0.642) (-2.882) 
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VC 0.348***   0.102 0.128 
 (3.956)   (1.184) (1.524) 
Market 0.987*** 0.773*** 0.035   
 (6.401) (3.090) (0.218)   
Concentration -0.006 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 (-1.323) (0.057) (0.145) (0.933) (-0.297) 
Log(Fund Raised) -1.262*** -1.878*** -0.299** -0.753*** -0.060 
 (-11.787) (-10.557) (-2.325) (-7.399) (-0.512) 
PTS 0.007 0.006 -0.004 0.010 -0.008 
 (1.153) (0.653) (-0.604) (1.557) (-1.201) 
      
Log Likelihood -969.236 -449.211 -1063.540 -893.123 -1449.053 
AIC 1986.471 942.420 2171.081 1830.246 2942.106 
Sample Size 1265 629 636 1080 185 
*Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
No obvious discrepancy is observed between the VC-backed and the 
non-VC-backed groups when underpricing is employed as the index. In the 
variance equation, the results differ. The number of firms listed in that month 
and listed on the SME or GEM Boards negatively influence the volatility in 
the non-VC-backed group, but do not significantly influence volatility in the 
VC-backed group. This finding implies that the initial returns of the 
non-VC-backed firms are highly sensitive to market-specific characteristics, 
while the underpricing levels are more stable for VC-backed firms.  
VC support may be treated as a reliable signal to investors under varying 
situations. For firm-specific characteristics such as leverage, whether a firm is 
involved in the high-technology industry will significantly affect the volatility 
of VC-backed firms, but insignificantly for non-VC-backed firms. With VC 
backing, corporate fundamentals play a more important role in valuation. 
These findings imply that although VC firms in China value reputation greatly, 
they also play the role of authentication agents. In the preceeding analysis in 
Section 3, this function is offset by the grandstanding effect, which has a 
positive influence on underpricing. 
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The regression results of the initial return equations do not show a distinct 
difference between firms listed on the Shanghai Main Board and those listed 
on the SME or the GEM Boards. When volatility is employed as the index, the 
SME or GEM group responds actively in general. Young firms, which are 
perceived by investors as riskier, have high return volatility on the SME or the 
GEM Boards. The number of firms listed in that month, which is a 
market-specific characteristic, negatively influences the volatility of initial 
returns. Additionally, the greater the amount of funds raised, the smaller the 
volatility of the returns on the SME or the GEM Boards. These results confirm 
the hypothesis that increased uncertainty can cause large volatility in post-IPO 
returns. Based on this information, the SME and the GEM Boards, which 
attract young high-technology firms and are associated with greater 
underpricing, seem to be slightly more efficient than the Shanghai Main 
Board.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Taking the initial return and the volatility of public firms in China as indices, 
we explore the effect of VC involvement on the difficulty of valuation and 
compare the market- and firm-specific characteristics of VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed firms. The findings show that VC firms in China can 
generally act as effective authentication agents and reduce the complexity of 
valuation. We show that this effect is smaller than the effect brought by their 
eagerness to build their reputations. Other variables, such as the ability of 
underwriters and firm attributions, signify that increased uncertainty can cause 
large underpricing and volatility in IPO. 
  The gross influence of VC on the uncertainty of valuation, represented by 
underpricing, is negative. First, underpricing is a cost to VC firms. High 
underpricing implies significant gains that are forgone by the VC firm. Setting 
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a low offering price to attract investors or bringing young firms to IPOs helps 
VC firms strengthen their reputation to attract additional funds. Second, VC 
backing may suggest a positive signal on the prospect and the value of the firm 
based on prior professional selection, support, and supervision. Additionally, 
VC firms can employ reputable underwriters through their advantages in 
networking. This can reduce uncertainty. These findings coincide with those of 
Chahine et al. (2007) for VC firms in France, and are opposite to the case of 
VC firms in England. 
  A more detailed study shows that for non-VC-backed firms, initial returns 
are more sensitive to market-specific characteristics, and corporate 
fundamentals play less important roles in valuation when compared to 
VC-backed firms. This indicates that although the VC firms in China value 
reputation greatly, they still act as authentication agents.  
  In particular, we show that VC-backed firms in China are young, bear low 
debt ratios, and are inclined to be in a high-technology industry at the time of 
IPO. In addition, these firms tend to be listed on the SME or the GEM Boards 
instead of the Shanghai Main Board, the latter of which includes many 
state-owned enterprises. This finding is consistent with the government’s 
purpose of establishing the SME and the GEM Boards. 
  The information of firms listed on the SME or the GEM Boards generally 
receives numerous active responses. The SME and the GEM Boards attract 
high-technology firms and young firms, both of which are associated with 
significant underpricing. These markets seem to act slightly more efficiently 
than the Shanghai Main Board. 
  The influence of firm characteristics, such as leverage and total funds raised, 
are in line with our expectations. Increased uncertainty can cause large 
underpricing and volatility in IPO. A firm’s age and level of technology in the 
industry will not affect amount of underpricing level during IPO or the 
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volatility. This finding shows that information is not rationally processed in the 
Chinese market. These observations may be reflective of the characteristics of 
investors that constitute the Chinese market. Compared with underpricing, 
which is widely used as a response to uncertainty in valuation, volatility seems 
to function as a better index in representing the complexity of valuation. 
Overall, our study addresses relevant implications for investors, managers 
of issuing firms, and governments. Investors in the Chinese primary stock 
market should buy into IPOs without VC-backing to achieve a high initial 
return, and investors in the secondary market should be cautious about newly 
listed stocks. Our results show that no obvious excess return exists within one 
year after the IPO, which is in line with the conjecture that more than half of 
first-day investors will face a loss. Funds seeking to invest in the early stages 
of start-ups should invest in firms with VC backing, as they will undergo IPOs 
earlier. Start-ups should try to obtain VC support to speed up development and 
to reach IPO earlier. As VC firms in China are still young and greatly value 
reputation, the government should continue to promote the development of the 
VC industry to hasten economic growth.  
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